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It is for good reasons that many people regard the world as unjust and
plagued with poverty. From that observation, one could draw the conclu-
sion that the state of the world is the result of existing international insti-
tutions and today’s ruling political ideologies. If you take this view, it is
hardly surprising that you also protest when international leaders and rep-
resentatives of ﬁfty-plus long-standing international organizations declare
that the recipe is “more of the same”—more and freer trade, stricter and
more norm-based ﬁscal and monetary policies, and the like. In addition,
although many of these leaders themselves come from democratic coun-
tries, they do not seem to bother too much about the absence of democracy
for poor people in many developing countries. Is it surprising that some
protest?
This paper takes as its starting point the criticism coming from the anti-
globalist movement. Two distinctly diﬀerent claims are looked into. First,
the claim that globalization is undemocratic and, second, that institutions
like the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the Inter-
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Following Sen (1999, chap. 6, 152), any country that “is independent,
that goes to elections regularly, that has opposition parties to voice criti-
cisms, and that permits newspapers to report freely and question the wis-
dom of governments policies without extensive censorship” is regarded as
democratic. The concept includes not only political rights (like the right to
form political parties that openly can compete for and be elected to posi-
tions of power in government), but also crucial civil liberties, like personal
freedoms, freedom of the press, belief, and association. Countries’ level of
democracy has been measured by index. One such index has been con-
structed from the Policy III data set, but there are several other indexes, like
the Freedom House index1 (see Gurr and Jaggers 1995).
The word “globalization” means diﬀerent things to diﬀerent people. To
limit confusion, here globalization means international trade in goods and
services and foreign investment.
Who are the anti-globalists?
There are strong tensions between organised labour and campaigning
non-governmental organisations (NGOs); between people who want to
protect national autonomy and those who want to override it; between
those who want to save the environment and those whose main aim is de-
velopment; between those who want to protect traditional ways of life
and those who want to upset them; and, of course, those who want re-
form and those who seek a revolutionary transformation. Some protest-
ers are self-interested. Others are idealistic. (Martin Wolf, Financial
Times, September 4, 2001)2
In the light of this description, is it possible to ﬁnd a common denomina-
tor among the anti-globalist NGOs?
First, many take one of three views: there should be less globalization
than there is today; globalization at least should not increase from today’s
magnitudes, or, if globalization would increase, it should not do so unless
there are some additional conditions attached to it. Second, many anti-
globalists take a skeptical view of international organizations like WTO, the
World Bank, and IMF (the latter two are generally regarded as international
ﬁnancial institutions [IFI]). Of course, it is possible to be positive toward
globalization and negative toward the present work of WTO and the IFIs.
2.3 Undemocratic Globalization?
What distinguishes many anti-globalists from others—like scholars and
journalists—is that some of them claim that they are able to represent the
preferences of others and not just themselves. There are
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1. The index, methodology, and criteria can be found on http://www.freedomhouse.org.
2. See also Bhagwati (2002a, c).grassroots NGOs claiming to represent people whose lives and liveli-
hood are being directly aﬀected by the actions and policies of the IMF,
the World Bank and the WTO. The argument here is that representation
in international institutions is imperfect. The emissaries of existing gov-
ernments fail to represent many groups’ rights and predicament. NGOs
acting in international fora are necessary to ﬁll the gap in representation
and accountability that results. (Woods and Narlikar 2001, 15)
This argument, as it stands, is not that globalization is necessarily bad, but
that not all views are represented when important decisions are taken in
international fora on for example, the rules of the multilateral-trading
system.
However, implicitly or explicitly, the critique is also that the preferences
of those who are notrepresented in international institutions are more neg-
ative on globalization than are the preferences of those who are repre-
sented. If the preferences of all concerned—the set of which is diﬃcult to
deﬁne precisely and whose preferences are more diﬃcult than usual to ag-
gregate—had been taken into account, then the decisions of the IFIs
would have yielded diﬀerent outcomes and less trade and foreign invest-
ment.
Let us consider a claim that the true preferences of peoples of the world
on globalization are more skeptical than the preferences reﬂected in the
policies of WTO’s member states and of member states and staﬀ of the
IFIs.
Can a hypothesis be rejected which states that the present ruling prefer-
ences on trade, economic integration, and investment—as reﬂected in the
policies of important rich and poor countries and consequently also in the
WTO and the IFI—reﬂect the views of a majority of the populations in
the rich and poor countries?
To discuss the popular preferences on globalization, two approaches are
used. Since we want to capture the history of Gatt/WTO rounds during the
last forty-plus years, we start oﬀby dividing countries into democratic Or-
ganization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member
countries and “other countries.” For the subset of OECD member coun-
tries, the question is whether or not it is possible that the preferences of the
electorate on trade and integration in a systematic way in elections have
differed from that of the democratically elected governments’ positions?
For the other countries, comparative international opinion polls on glob-
alization, trade integration, and protectionism are considered. With good
polls, one should be able to learn how respondents in diﬀerent countries
look upon globalization and trade. If such polls consistently would yield
the result that globalization and free trade are disliked and that respon-
dents are inward looking and in favor of protectionism, then the polls
would call into question the basis for many member countries’ positions
and of the policies of the IFIs.
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Do democratic member countries of, for example, the WTO diﬀer in pol-
icy positions from the voters’ preferences in a systematic pro-globalization
way?
Even if every government in the world were democratically elected, a
large problem of accountability would still remain for international or-
ganisations....  W e  h a v e  s e e n  t h a t  i n  n a tional politics a government
rarely wins or loses an election on a particular issue. Yet rarer would be
a government that won or lost an election (or oﬃce through some other
means) due to a position taken by its representative within an interna-
tional organisation. Indeed, given that elections do not hold politicians
to account on domestic issues, it would be rather ludicrous to assert that
they might serve as a mechanism of accountability in the international
sphere where voters have even less information, and less motivation to
cast their votes on such issues. Clearly elections as a mechanism of do-
mestic restraint on public oﬃcials cannot be stretched into an eﬀective
mechanism of accountability for international institutions even if every
government in the world were democratically elected. Yet this is pre-
cisely what the arguments about the traditional structure of governance
and representation attempts to do. (Woods and Narlikar 2001, 7)
The authors are hardly correct that “a government rarely wins or loses an
election on a particular issue.” There are plenty of counter examples unless
one deﬁnes “issue” in an extremely narrow sense. Apart from this ﬂaw in
the quote, the authors are probably correct if one would consider individ-
ual decisions in the WTO and most countries at a particular point in time.
But do isolated cases of narrowly deﬁned issues constitute the appropriate
sample? Our answer is no: The authors seem unlikely to be correct when
considering the direction of policy embedded in the large number of suc-
cessive decisions over some forty years on multilateral trade rounds result-
ing in lower trade barriers and enhanced economic integration.
Let us consider the OECD countries. To be a member of the OECD, a
country must fulﬁll the requirements of being a pluralistic democracy, en-
forcing respect for human rights, and having a market economy exposed to
international competition. Assuming that on average there has been at
least twenty-ﬁve such members per year since 1960 and that the average pe-
riod between general elections has been four years, this means that there
have been at least 250 general elections among this group. (The true num-
ber is higher since the number of members has increased, and the average
term is less than four years.) If these governments’ decisions to liberalize
(manufacturing) trade had been in a systematic conﬂict with the voters’
preferences, it is likely that such a misrepresentation at some points in time
had become serious election issues in some of the 250 elections.
Are voters in OECD countries—as a general rule—unmoved by issues
66 Carl B. Hamiltonlike trade, economic integration, and globalization? Trade has on several
occasions been an issue in U.S. elections—as reﬂected in the U.S. handling
of the Seattle WTO meeting in 1999 and the U.S. steel protection following
the 2000 presidential campaign. Trade has also ﬁgured on several earlier
occasions in U.S. politics (e.g., see Scheve and Slaughter 2001, chap. 1).
The post–World War II history of Western Europe has had many national
elections and referenda fought on aspects of economic and political inte-
gration. The outcomes of these elections and referenda have sometimes
forced governments to resign and have permanently split political parties.
From Western Europe we also have the additional experience that demo-
cratic countries—through elections and referenda—choose diﬀerent de-
grees of integration with the surrounding world. Switzerland has decided
to stay out of the European Union (EU), as well as the European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA). Norway and Iceland are members of the EEA, but they
are not members of the EU. Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Sweden
are members of the EU, but they have not (yet) adopted the common cur-
rency. The United Kingdom is a member of the EU, but not the Schengen
agreement on passport-control-free movement of persons. One can also
note that over time the European countries have decided, in democratic
processes, to integrate more and more.
The hypothesis does not seem possible to reject: The forty-plus years of
pro-globalization positions and decisions of OECD democracies represent
the preferences of their electorates.
If, on the other hand, it had been a correct description that trade issues
seldom have been signiﬁcant election issues, such an observation does not
warrant a claim that voters are unmoved by globalization issues. Precisely
for the opposite reason, political parties and governments may try to en-
sure that trade and integration issues do not become signiﬁcant ones in
elections. They can do this by trying to ensure beforehand that trade and
integration policies will be unlikely to cause—from their perspective—dis-
ruptive conﬂicts and undermine eﬀorts to control the agendas of the elec-
tion campaigns. Then the hypothesis cannot be rejected, of course.
Also, if voters had been opposed to a continued opening up of markets
for goods and services and investment, in Europe, for example, nationalis-
tic politicians at times can be expected to have capitalized on such senti-
ments. Indeed, one has seen inward-looking nationalistic movements in
many European countries, but these have typically focused on immigration
and asylum seekers and not on trade in goods and services and foreign in-
vestment. In several polls, xenophobia does not correlate reliably with the
respondents’ views on globalization.3
The conclusion is that the trend to liberalize in the multilateral trade ne-
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3. Received by mail from Dough Miller of Ipsos-Reid. The polls can (soon) be found on the
home page of the Political Science Department of Queens University, Canada.gotiations—including exceptions like agriculture and textiles—cannot
be said to have been in conﬂict in a systematic way with the preferences of
the voters in the OECD countries. Thus, one cannot reject the hypothesis
that some forty years of (pro-globalization) positions and decisions of the
OECD democracies have been in line with the OECD electorates’ prefer-
ences.
2.3.2 Other Countries
With the help of three international and comparative polls, the group of
countries is widened to include also important non-OECD ones, including
several ones that are not democratic.
Globalization
In October to December 2001, a poll on globalization was taken with
representative samples of individuals in twenty-ﬁve countries.4Some of the
questions are seen in the head of table 2.1.The survey results can be said to
be within a 3 percent positive or negative range of what they would have
been nineteen times out of twenty had the entire population been surveyed.
Globalization was deﬁned as international trade in goods and services and
in investment. In the table, the countries have been grouped in two classes,
richer and poorer ones. The column heads of table 2.1 supply, ﬁrst, the par-
ticipating countries’ GNP per capita and, second, the three diﬀerent ques-
tions that the respondents were asked.
The (unweighted) averages are strikingly similar (column [2]). Among
the OECD countries, Australia, France, and Spain stand out as the more
negative ones. Argentina’s and Turkey’s recent economic crises seem to be
reﬂected in strongly negative attitudes. Note the similar results for the
populous countries—China, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria—but also for
Qatar, Venezuela, and South Korea. They all report weak negative (col-
umn [2]) and strong positive (column [3]) attitudes to globalization. When
the results for poorer countries are weighted by population size, the pro-
globalization results of the four populous countries dominate. Thus, ac-
counting for some 43 percent of total world population and 51 percent of
all low- and middle-income countries’ population (in 1998), only some 10–
15 percent of the sample regarded globalization as negative. As many as
70–80 percent regarded globalization as positive. One should note in par-
ticular the positive Chinese responses to the country’s beneﬁts from inte-
gration with the world economy (columns [4], [7], and [10]).
Considering the two biggest economies, the United States and Japan, the
respondents of Japan were more skeptical to globalization than those of
the United States. In fact, the respondents of the United States and the
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.United Kingdom in this poll display very similar preferences on globaliza-
tion. One can also note the positive attitude to globalization found in Rus-
sia. The respondents throughout are more skeptical about the eﬀect of
globalization on jobs than on the economy as a whole. This is especially
striking for Germany, Japan, and Australia.
Trade and protection
The Ipsos-Reid Global Poll (2000) was taken at about the same time as
the previous one (i.e., November to December 2001).5 It covers twenty
countries, some of which overlap with the ﬁrst poll (see table 2.2). This poll
asks about free trade versus protection rather than the more vague concept
of globalization. Also, from this poll, it is diﬃcult to nail down any distinct
diﬀerence in opinions between, for example, rich and poor countries. An
open orientation of respondents in China and South Korea is conﬁrmed,
and Taiwan can be added as well. Mexicans seem distinctly positive to
openness in both polls, while the opposite holds for the Argentineans’ at-
titudes at the beginning of the acute phase of the country’s 2001–2002 cri-
sis. Again, France and Australia stand apart as skeptics to trade and glob-
alization. The U.S. respondents seem positive regarding globalization
generally, but seem negative toward free trade. This confused attitude is
shared with the United Kingdom and Brazil. The second question in table
2.2 tries to capture the response regarding the freedom to shop versus re-
strictions. Here there is another type of confusion, which is to say that in
four countries many respondents seem to prefer freedom to shop and re-
strictions on imports at the same time (i.e., the United States, Australia,
Poland, and Portugal).6
Scheve and Slaughter (2001) have looked more deeply into U.S. atti-
tudes. Their polls indicate that Americans think that international trade is
beneﬁcial from an overall perspective, but at the same time Americans
worry about job destruction and lower wages, in particular among lower-
skilled and lower-paid Americans.
The papers by Mayda and Rodrik (2001) and O’Rourke and Sinnott
(2001) both use the same database to look into similar questions. The data-
base that they use is the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), a sur-
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5. See the Ipsos-Reid Global Poll, 20 February 2002. The poll is available from http://www.
Thomas.riehle@ipsos-reid.com, and the methodology from http://www.rob.breitzkreutz@
ipsos-reid.com.
6. Given the French respondents’ consistently skeptical views on globalization and free
trade, it is somewhat surprising in the Ipsos-Reid poll that in no other country—apart from
the respondents in Japan and the United States itself—is it more popular to work for an
American company than in France. (That part of the poll is not discussed further here.) The
polls for France underscores one of France’s European dilemma, that is to say, wanting to be
the leader and engine of European integration and at the same time often being more skepti-
cal than other European countries about the beneﬁts of international trade, investment, and












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































”vey that was conducted in twenty-four countries in 1995 to 1996 and con-
cerned countries that can be characterized as old OECD plus Eastern Eu-
rope.7 The sample thus did not cover third-world countries (with the ex-
ception of the Philippines) and it was taken ﬁve years before the above two
polls. In the survey, the respondents were asked how much they agreed or
disagreed with the statement that their country “should limit the imports
of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.” In spite of
slightly diﬀerent methods being used to analyze the data, the two papers
arrive roughly at the same empirical conclusion. In a country that is abun-
dant in unskilled labor, relative to most of the rest of the world, the un-
skilled labor should be in favor of free trade. Mayda and Rodrik (2001, 3)
state the conclusion as such: “individual trade preferences interact with
country characteristics in exactly the manner predicted by the factor-
endowments model....  I t  i s  a  r o b ust result and perhaps our strongest
single ﬁnding.” They later elaborate that “Highly educated individuals tend
to be pro-trade in countries that are well endowed with human capital (the
USA), but against trade in countries that are poorly endowed with human
capital (the Philippines)” (2001, 32). O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001, 5) dis-
cuss the result outside the ISSP’s sample and the possibility that the con-
clusion would hold also for a larger sample, including the world’s poor
countries: “Of course, this is pure speculation on our part: nonetheless, the
results we are able to obtain from these data seem entirely consistent with
the insights of Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin.”
The results of the two polls presented above, if anything, support
O’Rourke and Sinnotts speculation that in populous countries, abundant
as they are in unskilled labor, the population on the whole would have a
free-trade orientation, in line with the predictions of the factor endow-
ments theory.
WTO
In a poll conducted by TEMO in June 2001 in Sweden, the respondents
were asked how they regarded WTO. The result was, ﬁrst, that the WTO
was regarded as “very positive” or “positive” by 44 percent, which was
much less than for the UN (88 percent), but slightly more than for the EU
(40 percent). However, almost half of the respondents answered either that
they were neither positive nor negative to WTO, or that they didn’t know.8
74 Carl B. Hamilton
7. Speciﬁcally, the countries are Australia, West Germany, East Germany, Great Britain,
the United States, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, New Zealand, Canada, Philippines,
Japan, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia.
8. See Svenska folket om globalisering (The Swedish population on globalization), TEMO
investigation no. T-21950, 26 June, 2001; see http://www.temo.se. Several questions were
asked in addition to the one on WTO. One of these was on child labor: Of the generally free-
trade-oriented group of Swedish respondents, no less than 74 percent agreed with the state-
ment that Sweden should not trade with countries allowing child labor.From these polls, it does not seem possible to reject the hypotheses that
when governments and international institutions advocate and promote
openness, they reﬂect the views of the majority of populations of the
OECD countries and distinctly poor countries of the world.
2.4 Can Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
Fill a Gap in Representation and Accountability?
Suppose that the above conclusions—based on some polls and the re-
vealed record of decades of policy making in democracies—were wrong.
Still the question remains as to whether or not NGOs’ preferences could be
said to be less wrong. To quote a view presented in Woods and Narlikar
(2001, 15), is it true that “NGOs acting in international fora are necessary
to ﬁll the gap in representation and accountability”? Are the preferences of
NGOs focusing on trade and development more representative and more
correct as a starting point for decisions on globalization and trade rules
than current polls and the revealed positions of the democracies of the
world?
First of all, there are many hundreds of NGOs; they do not think alike,
and their internal systems of representation and accountability diﬀer. Sec-
ond, most NGOs have their origin in developed countries and are likely to
reﬂect knowledge of and concerns about development felt in their home
countries. These values and priorities need not be same as those of the poor
countries, of course: “A long standing concern about these NGOs is that
their activities further magnify the voice and inﬂuence of industrial coun-
tries’ peoples and governments in international debates and institutions
which already disproportionately represent the industrialised world”
(Woods and Narlikar 2001, 15). Of the 738 NGOs accredited to the 1999
WTO-meeting in Seattle, 87 percent were based in industrialized coun-
tries (UNDP 2002, 8). The largest Swedish NGO—Forum Syd (Forum
South)—is an umbrella organization for all Swedish-development NGOs
and it is ﬁnanced entirely by the Swedish state through its aid agency
Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). The interest of
rich countries in poor countries’ labor standards and environmental pro-
tection is often in those poor countries regarded as a particularly hypo-
critical form of protection against their exports.9
The NGOs are like multinational ﬁrms (MNF), trade unions, and farm-
ers’ organizations in the sense that they all have roles to play in domestic
policy discussions. They can also be invited and included in country dele-
gations since the composition of these is a national decision. An NGO or
an individual from a developed country can quite legitimately be made a
member of a poor country’s team. However, a formalized role for NGOs,
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9. See Bhagwati (1995) and (2002b).MNFs, trade unions, farmers’ organizations, and the like in the inter-
national debates, negotiations, and decision making of the WTO or IFIs
raises serious questions about representation and accountability. What cri-
teria should be applied when selecting MNFs and NGOs? To state that
“such a selection [of NGOs] should be done in collaboration with civil
society”—as suggested by Bellman and Gerster (1996, 40)—is not a start-
ing point since it just raises the question of the operational content of the
concept of “civil society.” Furthermore, there are no guarantees against—
but instead the very real risk—that a formal role for MNFs and NGOs
would give some countries extra votes. Likewise, there are no guarantees
against—but the opposite due to the logic of realpolitik—that some NGOs
would be funded (and founded) by MNFs, farmers’ organizations, trade
unions, and other organized interest groups, and operate under the cover
of a NGO label.
A typical NGO often starts with concerns for speciﬁc projects or issues.
Perhaps it is for this reason that most NGOs have developed a micro-
perspective of development. They can be involved in projects focusing on
farming in some region; the plight of women, children and education;
microcredits; environmental concerns; and so forth. These are all honor-
able causes, but—from the point of view of representation of views—the
overall result is likely to be tilted in favor of distributional issues and 
“soft” policy stances. There are few, if any, NGOs devoted to “hard” issues,
like the enhancement of better and more stringent rules for budget disci-
pline, ﬁnancial-sector reforms, the reform and abolition of bad banks, 
a uniﬁed exchange rate, a rent-free trade policy, or simply economic eﬃ-
ciency.
There are some particular aspects of the links between democracy,
NGOs, and developing countries that merit consideration. First, if a (poor)
country is on its way to democracy, it can be risky for an international in-
stitution to bypass the fragile democracy and its institutions and instead
use an NGO as the institution’s channel to the population, even if the NGO
is run in an exemplary manner. There need not be a conﬂict between frag-
ile democracy and an NGO, of course, but there is a clear procedural
dilemma.
Second, poor countries have well-known diﬃculties with participation
in the WTO. If well-funded NGOs, MFNs, and so forth are given formal-
ized roles—like the right to be heard or speak in decision-shaping pro-
cesses (as urged by Bellman and Gerster 1996)—that is very likely to result
in a crowding out of poor countries’ struggle for attention and inﬂuence in
WTO. Today, well-funded and capable NGOs already can achieve what
many poor countries cannot aﬀord, that is a presence in Geneva and being
continuously involved in WTO activities. If scarce resources, like time in
the WTO machinery, are spent on presentations of the views of NGOs,
76 Carl B. HamiltonMNFs, and others, such a time allocation will almost certainly be at the ex-
pense of weaker parties, like poor countries’ and their interests.10
A most surprising aspect of Bellman and Gerster (1996) is that they do
not seem to recognize that their demand for signiﬁcantly larger inﬂuence
of NGOs in WTO would be at the expense of their other major request—
a vastly expanded role for national parliaments. Neither do they seem to
realize the separation of roles in a parliamentary democracy regarding de-
cision preparation and decision making between the government (execu-
tive) and the parliament (their description of the role of parliaments in the
formulation of countries’ trade policy is not always correct).11
In conclusion, it is impossible to give a deﬁnite answer for all places and
times on the value and a proper role of NGOs. Neither does it seem pos-
sible to deliver an answer to the question if NGOs can ﬁll a gap when it ex-
ists and properly reﬂect the preferences of others, like the poor persons of
a country. However, in the light of the above, it seems very unlikely that
NGOs normally could ﬁll a gap. The burden of proof rests heavily on the
NGOs themselves.
2.5 International Institutions, Globalization, and Democracy.
Now the second criticism—the claim that decisions taken in interna-
tional institutions like WTO and IFI are undemocratic—is considered. It
is clearly correct that these decisions are imperfect reﬂections of the views
of the peoples of the world. This is so in spite of a statement like the fol-
lowing from an otherwise excellent book on WTO: “Some would argue that
...   the WTO is probably the most democratic international organisation
extant, in that it operates by consensus and, if voting occurs, it is on the
basis of one-member-one-vote” (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001, 70).12 For
example, not all of WTO members are democracies (e.g., China and Saudi
Arabia), and such member countries’ representatives should not be as-
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10. Bellman and Gerster (1996) argue for NGO participation in several ways in WTO: In
the dispute settlement process (Article 13.2), they suggest that “NGO participation could
possibly be enhanced if recourse to [NGO contributions] were to be made compulsory” (37).
The WTO and NGOs (jointly?) should undertake systematic “impact assessment studies on
development and the environment” (40, 62). In addition, NGOs should have observer status
in WTO’s Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) and on WTO’s Committee on Trade
and Environment (CTE). However, Bellman and Gerster (1996) do not suggest that there
would be any NGO interest for a role in WTO’s Committee on Budget, Finance, and Admin-
istration. This reinforces an impression of wanting to play with the angels only.
11. Bellman and Gerster (1996, 50) write, “Parliamentarians are authorized to participate
only . . . as observers [in the WTO].” What other role could they possibly take on without re-
placing the government?
12. Also, the UNDP (2002, 8) takes the view that democracy in WTO would be one
country, one vote: “Consider the World Trade Organization. Every member has one vote,
which is very democratic.”sumed even to have the representation of the population as their ambition.
Furthermore, why should Iceland and India—with 350,000 and nearly one
billion inhabitants, respectively—have the same number of votes? If one
were thinking about even some imperfect approximation of democracy, it
would be reasonable for India to have more votes than Iceland. These re-
marks do not mean that the issue of representation of preferences in inter-
national institutions would be trivial or unimportant—quite the contrary;
Demands for more democracy in intergovernmental organizations is more
complex than many critics of WTO and the IFIs seem prepared to discuss.
One cannot ignore the basic undemocratic feature, namely, that it is the
nation-state that has a right to membership of WTO and IFIs.
One would have thought that demands for global democracy, a global
parliament, and a world government would be the logical visionary alter-
native suggested by the critics of today’s intergovernmental organizations
(e.g., one along the lines suggested by the world federalist movements). But
just the opposite seems to be the rule: The anti-globalists seem more local
than global in their visions when it comes to political decision making
(“glocalism”).
Thus, issues on international trade and globalization will likely continue
to be handled by governments in intergovernmental organizations and by
diplomats and other civil servants. Then, negotiations and decisions are
prepared and taken in processes that are not always open and—to be eﬀec-
tive—many times cannot be open except with a time lag.13 This is a classic
problem of democratic accountability in foreign and security policy, and it
is not speciﬁc to WTO and IFIs. The problem is handled in slightly diﬀer-
ent ways in diﬀerent democracies, and generally speaking, through parlia-
mentary committees with special rights to secret information, to closed
sessions, and to the possibility of being consulted and deciding on negoti-
ating positions. However, compared to a normal parliamentary control of
governments’ domestic actions, the control of what goes on in interna-
tional organizations is often weak and indirect and is dominated by the
participating governments’ agendas and selection of information. Fur-
thermore, it is only in the subset of democratic member states of WTO and
IFI that parliamentary control can be exercised.
Moreover, the parliamentary perspective is typically a national one. The
economist’s interest in the global-welfare eﬀects of trade reform, systemic
aspects of the global trading system, and problems of regionalism attract
few votes and have few pressure groups working for them. This, of course,
just makes economists’ contributions on these matters relatively more im-
portant.
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13. The time lag normally can be anything between two hours or a few weeks, and only
rarely would it be necessary to last for years.2.6 Globalization, Democracy, and Poverty Reduction
The democratic deﬁcit that is part and parcel of the intergovernmental
form of decision making makes the WTO and IFIs natural targets for
many anti-globalists.14 However, the fact that the WTO and the IFIs are
not actually being run in a democratic way does not exclude the possibility
that they would advocate democracy as the preferred mode of government
of nations. However, the IFIs are not seen to argue in favor of democracy.
Should the IFIs be neutral on the issue? This section looks into the issue
both in the light of the anti-globalist critique and the UN’s poverty-
reduction objective.
It is likely that the anti-globalists’ criticism that owners and staﬀ of the
IFIs promote globalization from an undemocratic platform would lose
ground if the IFIs would argue openly for democracy in member states, but
avoiding such criticism cannot be the aim of the IFIs. There is a much more
substantive issue, namely whether democracy is instrumental in achieving
the IFIs’ stated overriding objective (i.e., poverty reduction) in addition to
being a desirable objective per se.
Second, the IMF and the World Bank support the UN’s Millennium De-
velopment Goals. These are, by the year 2015, “to have reduced by half the
proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day, and to have reduced
by half the proportion of people who suﬀer from hunger,” while improving
health, education, and the environment (see the UN website at http://
www.un.org/milleniumgoals/index.htlm).
2.6.1 Governance, Poverty, and Democracy
Individuals have preferences not only over outcomes, but also over pro-
cesses. Thus, measures taken to enhance openness and globalization that
have been decided upon through a democratic process are more legitimate
and should have a better chance of long-term survival than if the same
decisions were arrived at in some other way (e.g., through a dictator’s de-
cision, occupation of territory, or external pressures). This is described by
the IFIs as the importance to apply “participatory approaches” and for gov-
ernments to “own” domestic reforms and policies. A democratic process
is—among other things—a participatory approach. Ceteris paribus, democ-
racy thus seems desirable for the IFIs from a governance point of view.
Of course, the World Bank has for many years been working on so-called
governance issues, but the Bank has not seen it proper to argue openly and
clearly in favor of democracy.
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14. After the ISTI conference, the UNDP (2002) published its development report. It con-
tains much material on governance, poverty, and democracy. The UNDP—like the UN,
WTO, and the IFIs—is not a democratic organization, of course.The World Bank has identiﬁed three distinct aspects of governance: (i)
the form of political regime; (ii) the process by which authority is exer-
cised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources
for development; and (iii) the capacity of governments to design, for-
mulate, and implement policies and discharge functions. The ﬁrst aspect
is deemed outside the Bank’s mandate. (World Bank 1994, xiv, our italics)
The Bank at times seems very close to endorsing democracy with a gover-
nance motivation, although it never calls for a democratic process or democ-
racy: “It is all about equal opportunity and empowerment for people,
especially the poor,” as stated by director James Wolfenson (World Bank
2002, iii). The Bank can go to great lengths not to use the word democ-
racy when it describes desirable governance policies.
Exchanging information through open debate creates demand for insti-
tutional change by holding people accountable, by changing behaviour,
and by supplying ideas for change from outside the community . . . De-
veloping country actors often face too little competition, often because
of current institutional structures.” (World Bank 2002a, 4 and iv)
Democracy and desirable economic reforms are about power, of course.
The eﬀectiveness of institutional designs adopted by governments will
be aﬀected by the political distribution of power....   Sometimes policy-
makers wishing to embark on reforms may have to create new institu-
tions . . . ineﬀective institutions may exist in part because there are no in-
terest groups pressing for change—not because some interest groups
oppose change. (World Bank 2002a, 10)
Against this background of World Bank descriptions of desirable ap-
proaches to governance—to reach the objective of reducing poverty by half
to 2015—there seems reason for the Bank and its owners to be clearly in fa-
vor of democracy from a governance point of view (if for no other reason).
It seems important to note, before leaving the governance argument, to
point out that the above conclusion is not a claim that democracy itself nec-
essarily fosters economic growth. There is a fairly large and inconclusive
discussion of this diﬀerent, but related, issue (e.g., Bhalla 1997; Przeworski
and Limongi 1993, 1997; Stiglitz 1999) and a brief survey in the United Na-
tions Development Program (UNDP; 2002, 56 box 2.4). Good arguments
are put forward both for and against the suggestion that democracy is good
for growth. However, in surveys, like UNDP (2002), the observation is
made that “democracy appears to prevent the worst outcomes, even if it
does not guarantee the best ones” (56).
2.6.2 Famines as Acute Poverty and Democracy
An important example in which democracy provides a channel for in-
formation and an early warning system is when there is a risk of famine.
Sen and Drèze have focused on this acute form of poverty.
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with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press.
Famines have occurred in ancient kingdoms and contemporary author-
itarian societies, in tribal communities and in modern technocratic dic-
tatorships, in colonial economies run by imperialists from the north and
newly independent countries of the south run by despotic national lead-
ers or by intolerant single parties. But they have never materialised in
any country that is independent, that goes to elections regularly, that has
opposition parties to voice criticisms, and that permits newspapers to re-
port freely and question the wisdom of governments’ policies without
extensive censorship. (Sen 1999, 152)15
An interpretation of this result is that the eﬀect of democracy is to reduce
variance of economic performance: “One can argue that regimes aﬀect the
variance of rates [of economic growth], and speciﬁcally, that democracies
are less likely to generate both miracles and disasters than dictatorships”
(Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 166).16 Against this background and since
the IFIs have as their objective to reduce poverty by half by 2015, the IFIs
should be in favor of democracy as an antifamine method, if for no other
reason.
2.6.3 The “Democratic Peace” and Poverty Reduction
A second important claim for democracy is that there have been no wars
between democracies (the democratic peace). The argument does not ap-
ply to wars between democracies and nondemocracies, it does not apply
just to self-defense situations, and it does not apply to peace within democ-
racies. The latter is important to note since a large part of today’s violence
occurs in conﬂicts within states. The huge discussion in the international
relations literature on democratic peace has been summarized as follows.
Although some still argue that the hypothesised impact of democracy
on peace is spurious, or that causality runs from peace to democracy
rather than from democracy to peace [references], there is a growing
consensus that the pacifying eﬀects of joint democracy are real. While
some say that it goes too far to claim that the absence of war between
democracies ‘comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law
in international relations’ (Levy 1980, 270), no one has identiﬁed a
stronger empirical regularity, and many make the law-like claim that
joint democracy is a suﬃcient condition for peace [references]. (Levy
2002, 358–59)17
Globalization and Democracy 81
15. Sen (1999) also refers to this point in chapters 2 and 6. See also Drèze and Sen (1989).
16. The infant mortality rate is a measure of basic hygiene and health conditions and thus
has been used as a proxy measure of poverty. Bhalla (1997) arrived at the conclusion that the
increased democracy of a country results in a faster decline in the infant mortality rate.
17. Other references on the democratic peace discussion are Brown, Lynn-Jones, and
Miller (1996); Russett (1993); Cederman (2001); Russett and Oneal (2001); and Hegre et al.
(2001).The next question is why democracies do not wage war against each
other. There are basically two lines of explanations. The ﬁrst one is ideo-
logical and refers to a democratic ethos that is being developed—toler-
ance, moderation, basic inclination to seek peaceful conﬂict resolution,
and so forth. The other one is structural. A democratic structure implies
that there is power sharing, public accountability, and so forth, and this
makes it diﬃcult for leaders to convince citizens to go to war. However, for
the present purpose, there is no need to have an answer to the debate on
the causality.18 It is enough to conclude that it has a signiﬁcant value if
countries are democracies since it prevents wars against other democra-
cies and reduces poverty that would otherwise have been a consequence of
such conﬂicts. For example, had Africa’s nations become democracies af-
ter independence, some of the violence on the continent would not have
occurred, and poverty and other disasters would have been less wide-
spread. However, the numerous and bloody civil wars (e.g., in Angola,
Rwanda, and Burundi) would not necessarily have been prevented—but,
on the other hand, it may be that the drawn-out and disastrous civil war in
Angola would have been a brief and limited conﬂict had South Africa, So-
viet Union, and Cuba been democracies at the time. There are probably
more examples of this kind.19
To summarize, starting from the objective of the UN and the World
Bank to reduce poverty, which is endorsed by the Bank’s owners, there
are at least three arguments for the Bank to state that democracy is the
preferred mode of government, that is to say, governance, elimination of
famines, and reduction in war. This does not mean that the Bank’s mem-
bership would be limited to democracies only or that only democratic
member countries would be allowed to borrow or receive technical as-
sistance from the Bank. However, it would imply that the Bank—to en-
hance its own poverty-reduction objective—should be crystal clear on
the issue that the Bank prefers democracy to other modes of govern-
ment. A link between democracy and poverty reduction implies also that
the Bank should support projects with the objective of enhancing
democracy, like fostering and supporting independent media, technical
assistance on the practicalities of democracy in the legal system, and so
forth.
By analogy, the IMF could consider the same policy on democracy as
the preferred form of government.
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18. For a recent survey, see chapter 18 of the Handbook of International Relations, as quoted
by Levy (2002).
19. There seems to be a parallel to the democratic peace, that is, democratic trade liberali-
sation: Democratic pairs of countries tend to be more likely to cooperate to lower trade bar-
riers and to sign trade-liberalizing agreements than are autocratic ones (Mansﬁeld, Milner,
and Rosendorﬀ 1997, 1998).2.6.4 Openness and Democracy
We now return to the globalization theme. Taking democracy to be the
preferred mode of government, and if openness—as a suggestion—would
enhance democracy, then increased openness would be desirable as an in-
strument for enhanced democracy and (in the next step) reduced poverty.
What can be said about the relationship between economic openness
and democracy?
Is there causality from democracy to openness or vice versa? Milner and
Kubota (2001) ask the question of whether or not democracy is conducive
to trade liberalization. They ﬁnd empirical evidence that democracy, in
general, and democratization have contributed to the lowering of trade
barriers in a number of developing countries since the 1970s (i.e., they ﬁnd
a causality from democracy to increased openness). The model that they
test deﬁnes democratization as an expansion of the group of actors in-
volved in government.
Democratisation means a movement toward majority rule with univer-
sal suﬀrage . . . [and] the democratisation of the political system may
open up new avenues of support for free trade . . . and reduce the ability
of governments to use trade barriers [and rents] as a strategy for building
political support....  P olitical leaders may have to compensate more vot-
ing consumers for the same level of protection [i.e. with the same amount
of total rent], and may no longer be able to aﬀord as much protection
[rent per supporter]....  H e n c e  a n  increase in the size of the electorate
and thus the winning coalition may change political leaders’ optimal
policy in the direction of freer trade, ceteris paribus. (Milner and Kub-
ota 2001; 6, 19, and 10–11)
Using data for over 100 developing countries in the period 1970–1999, the
authors then provide empirical evidence for the hypothesis that more dem-
ocratic countries have lower trade barriers and are more open economies.
However, as the authors themselves acknowledge, they regard democrati-
zation as exogenous. “It might be that having a more open trade regime
exerts an impact on the type of political regime. Although we lag all our
independent variables [in the testing] this could be a longer term eﬀect”
(Milner and Kubota 2001, 41).
Two estimates undertaken in this chapter suggest that openness and
democracy go together. I do not claim to establish a direction of causality.
Since the early 1970s, Freedom House (FH) has evaluated almost all coun-
tries’ status with regard to political rights and civil liberties in its annual
surveys20 and has constructed a democracy index with a scale running
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20. The methodology, criteria, and so forth that have been developed over the years can be
found on http://www.freedomhouse.org.from1 to 8. The lower the number, the more democratic the country. In the
2000–2001 survey, the traditional developed countries, as well as many
other countries, take on values below 2.21 To measure countries’ openness,
two proxies were used: The ﬁrst one was countries’ simple mean tariﬀ
(from World Bank 2002b, table 6.6). The hypothesis is that there would be
a correlation between the level of the simple mean tariﬀ at the end of the
1990s (mostly either in 1998 or 1999) and the value of the 2000–2001
democracy index. A standard (Pearson) correlation coeﬃcient yields r2  
0.44 for the tariﬀvariable (signiﬁcant at the 99.9 percent level; n 91). The
hypothesis that openness—measured as a lower mean tariﬀ—is positively
correlated with democracy cannot be rejected.
As a second proxy for openness was used for the relative change between
1989 and 1999 in trade as share of GNP, that is, (X   M)/GNP, measured
in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and calculated from World Devel-
opment Indicators 2001, table 6.1 (World Bank 2002b). The hypothesis is
that there is a negative correlation between a change in share of trade in
GNP and the value of the democracy index (remember, the more democ-
racy, the lower the index value). Again, a correlation calculation yields r2
  –0.19, and a signiﬁcant correlation at just about the 90 percent level be-
tween our measure of change in openness and the FH measure of democ-
racy (n 75). Again, the hypothesis that openness and democracy are pos-
itively correlated cannot be rejected.
Finally, one should note one of the poll results of table 2.3(statement 5).
Respondents were asked about the perceived eﬀect of globalization on
diﬀerent aspects of life. Globalization was regarded as much more positive
than negative for human rights, individual freedom, and democracy.22
In summary, it may be that the character of political regimes has a direct
eﬀect on trade policy, and, at the very least, it seems very plausible that
openness and democracy go together. If so, it has important implications
for the present conﬂict over the value of globalization. If the causality goes
from openness to democracy, and if anti-globalists’ demand for less open-
ness and reduced world economic integration was satisﬁed, it would mean
reduced prospects for democratic development. Accepting the positive
eﬀect of democracy on governance, famine prevention, and peace, less
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21. Examples are Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Mauritius, Panama,
South Africa, Surinam, Taiwan, and Uruguay. Most Caribbean countries and also Benin,
Botswana, Bulgaria, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guyana, India, Jamaica, South Ko-
rea, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines,
and Thailand are found just above the value 2. The least democratic ones take on numbers at
the other end of the scale, like Algeria, Angola, Belarus and most other Commonwealth of
Independent States countries, Bahrain, Brunei, Burma, Cameroon, China, Cuba, Egypt,
Iran, Kenya, North Korea, Libya, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria,
Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.
22. An aggregate view of the meaning of the other economic variables of table 2.2 is hard
to formulate since they seem rather contradictory.openness would be negative for poverty reduction over and above the tra-
ditional arguments in favor of division of labor through international
trade.
If, on the other hand, the causality goes from democracy to openness
(e.g., in the developing countries, as suggested by Milner and Kubota
2001), the anti-globalists would have two channels for their argumenta-
tion: First, to argue directly against international trade and investment or,
second, to argue against the spread and enhancement of democratic rule in
poor countries. Alternatively put, the Milner-Kubota result points to a
choice that would have to be made with regard to developing countries be-
tween either (a) more democracy and more openness or (b) less democracy
and less pressure for openness.
2.7 The World Trade Organization (WTO) and Accountability
Anti-globalists criticize the WTO for working without proper demo-
cratic accountability and being dominated by a few countries, leaving the
others outside. Member governments have handled this criticism by im-
proving transparency, public observation, and openness to the press.23
Focusing on the European perspective, the EU Commissioner for Ex-
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Table 2.3 The Perceived Relationship between Globalization and Fifteen Variable Conditions
for Twenty-Five Countries, October–December 2001 (%)
Response
Statement Worse Better Diﬀerence
1. Access to foreign markets 22 66 44
2. Availability of inexpensive products 25 63 38
3. Your family’s quality of life 23 60 37
4. Natural cultural life 28 60 32
5. Human rights, individual freedom, and democracy 28 57 29
6. National economy 33 56 23
7. Your income and buying power 27 54 27
8. Economic development in poor countries 36 51 15
9. Quality of jobs in country 39  48 9
10. World peace and stability 38 47 9
11. Workers’ rights, working conditions, and wages 40 47 7
12. Economic equality in the world 40 45 5
13. Number of jobs in country 46 42 –4
14. World poverty and homelessness 45 41 –4
15. Environmental quality in the world 47 41 –6
Source: Data from World Economic Forum “Global Public Opinion on Globalization,” conducted by
Environics International Ltd. in collaboration with the World Economic Forum, February 2002
23. See Sampson (2001).ternal Trade, Pascal Lamy, in 2001 provided four suggestions to democra-
tize the WTO. First, Lamy suggested more transparency “at home” in
member countries; second, “a closer involvement of Parliaments in WTO
matters, both in capitals and in Geneva”; and third, “a substantial rein-
forcement of the rights of the European Parliament [EP] in the formulation
and control of trade policy” (Lamy 2001). Finally, Lamy thought that
“there is merit in discussing the establishment of a WTO Parliamentary
Consultative Assembly” (Lamy 2001). While there seems to be little reason
to oppose the ﬁrst or second proposals (see the following discussion), there
are important argument against the last one.24
A Parliamentary Consultative Assembly of the WTO would cause consti-
tutional confusion. First, the WTO was set up in the mid-1990s as an inter-
governmental organization in which governments and the EU, through its
commission, are represented. In such a system, there is no decision-shaping
or decision-making role for a parliamentary body. The body would risk be-
ing a pseudodemocratic side scene. If so, ﬁrst, the end result could be just the
opposite one to the proclaimed one, that is to say, to discredit the WTO. Sec-
ond, all delegates would not be elected (directly or indirectly) through a
democratic procedure (China and Saudi Arabia, again, are clear examples).
Third, “at home” in the WTO’s democratic member states, a consultative as-
sembly would cause constitutional confusion about the roles of the execu-
tive and legislative branches in the area of external trade policy.
Democratically elected parliamentarians and free media are two of the
most important democratic control mechanisms. Considering Lamy’s sec-
ond suggestion, it may well be an advantage for the WTO and for the de-
bate in member states if a larger number of democratically accountable
persons learned more about the world trading system—what the WTO can
and cannot do, since enhanced globalization and WTO-related issues have
become increasingly domestic and more important in domestic politics.
With regard to parliamentarians, two to three members of a country’s par-
liament, for example, could be attached to the task of following WTO mat-
ters more closely. They could do this at home through hearings and inves-
tigations in parliamentary committees, as well as through regular observer
participation in, for example, WTO seminars on speciﬁc issues, key coun-
tries and country groups, and systemic aspects of world trade. To achieve
this enhancement of accountability, there is no need for any new interna-
tional agreements or bodies, but instead for national decisions by national
parliaments to become more active in this area. (Some countries already
have such arrangements.)
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24. The convention on the future constitution of the European Union suggested 2003 that
the EP would have a bigger role in the EU’s external trade policy. If implemented, the result
is likely to be reduced eﬀectiveness on the part of the EU in international trade negotiations.2.8 Concluding Remarks: The Globalization Paradox
Globalization in the sense used in this paper, opens up increased possi-
bilities for citizens as well as governments through an enhanced global di-
vision of labor. Potentially, all citizens can enjoy the fruits of increased spe-
cialization, for example, in the form of higher incomes and a larger menu
of goods and services to choose from. Governments can exploit a larger tax
base and provide more public goods and services as well as transfers. Glob-
alization is also likely to enhance democracy. However, globalization at the
same time reduces governments’ room for maneuveringbecause of a more in-
tensive international competition and international rules, like those of
WTO. This is a paradox of globalization. Unfortunately the global anti-
globalist movement seems unable to see anything but the latter part of this
paradox, in spite of being a typical product of the globalization age.
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Comment Kimberly Ann Elliott
The survey of anti- or alternative globalization activists by myself, De-
bayani Kar, and J. David Richardson (in this volume) ﬁnds that critics are
as concerned about the legitimacy of the process by which globalization is
occurring as they are about the outcome. But process and outcomes are
also linked in their minds. Many critics believe that the globalization out-
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Kimberly Ann Elliott is a fellow at the Institute for International Economics.comes they perceive as being unbalanced and unsustainable, both ecolog-
ically and socially, result from a negotiation and rule-making process that
is also unbalanced and undemocratic.
Carl Hamilton’s interesting paper approaches these issues from a variety
of angles. He examines survey results to ask whether pro-globalization
policies are at odds with public opinion and ﬁnds that, in most countries,
it does not appear that they are. He then asks whether it is plausible that
ﬁfty years of post–World War II liberalization could be fundamentally at
odds with voter preferences in democratic countries and, again, concludes
that it is not. Hamilton also argues that NGOs do not necessarily make ex-
isting institutional arrangements any more representative or accountable
and that including them more formally in the process could squeeze out the
voices of developing countries with, sometimes, more limited resources
and inﬂuence. Hamilton concludes that governments do pretty well at rep-
resenting the interests of their citizens and that existing intergovernmental
institutions should remain just that. He does, however, recommend that
the international ﬁnancial institutions embrace democratic governance
more explicitly in their work—for both legitimacy and pro-development
reasons—and that the WTO consider engaging parliamentarians from
member countries more intensively, through observer status and education
programs, and encouraging these representatives to learn about and follow
WTO activities more closely.
While the call for the IFIs to embrace democracy would clearly be wel-
comed by globalization’s critics, Hamilton’s other responses to their con-
cerns are unlikely to sway many. Breaking the analysis down along slightly
diﬀerent lines, however—on the nature of democratic process and the
changing nature of the globalization—could help to move the dialogue
further along. This comment will focus on three distinctions that could
help:
• transparency and accountability as core elements of democracy,
which highlights the distinction between having a voice but not neces-
sarily a vote;
• changes in the negotiating agenda, from lowering border barriers to
writing rules to govern globalization that potentially conﬂict with na-
tional laws and regulations; and,
• the need to recognize important nuances in the polling data that sug-
gest broad support for globalization is contingent on complementary
policies to address the costs.
The Meaning of Democracy
The ultimate measure of eﬀective democracy is a government that is ac-
countable to its citizens. Transparency is a key tool in ensuring democratic
accountability. Voting is a means of allowing citizens to express their pref-
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tion, media repression, or other illiberal institutions impede transparency,
give certain groups or individuals in a society preferential access, and pre-
vent oﬃcials’ being held accountable for their actions. This suggests that
democratic legitimacy could be improved by increasing transparency, as
both the IFIs and the WTO have done in recent years, and by ensuring that
all relevant constituencies, and not just privileged ones, have access to the
process. This does not mean that NGOs or other representatives of civil so-
ciety need to have a vote or a veto, but allowing them more access in the
form of voice could result in outcomes that are more acceptable and more
sustainable.
How this might be done would diﬀer from institution to institution . . .
more meaningful consultation with aﬀected populations in World Bank
projects? amicus curae briefs in WTO dispute settlement? less extensive, de-
tailed IMF conditionality?
Finally, there is another large hole in the argument that governments ad-
equately represent their citizens and that intergovernmental institutions
should remain as such. As the WTO membership has expanded, more non-
democratic countries have joined, most notably China, and as developing
countries have become more active in negotiations and in decision making,
questions about the legitimacy of outcomes have grown. The consensus
rule of decision making in the WTO ameliorates this concern to some de-
gree (thanks to Robert Baldwin for pointing this out), but the greater the
weight of large and undemocratic regimes in the WTO (China, Egypt,
Malaysia, Burma, potentially Vietnam) the more the concern will grow.
Process and the Changing Agenda
Negotiation and ratiﬁcation rules appropriate for bargaining over bor-
der barriers may be less appropriate for writing rules that constrain na-
tional and local policy autonomy in areas previously regarded as primarily
domestic—food health and safety, services regulation, and professional
certiﬁcation and licensing.
Although there were always import-competing industries that opposed
liberalization that threatened their interests, there is a broad consensus that
eliminating tariﬀs, quotas, and other explicit discrimination between for-
eign and domestically produced goods and services improves national and
global welfare. There is no such consensus regarding the appropriate level
of regulation for health and safety or other public purposes; and as the
WTO has moved from removing de jure discrimination to de facto discrim-
ination, which requires judging the legitimacy of the regulations themselves
(e.g., with respect to genetically modiﬁed organisms or the use of hormones
or antibiotics in meat production), the conﬂicts have sharply increased.
In these areas, single-undertaking and fast-track (in the United States)
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and preventing log-rolling in tariﬀ bargaining—may be neither.
Examining the Polling Data More Carefully
General questions about people’s attitudes toward globalization do not
tell us much. More detailed surveys, such as those conducted or summa-
rized by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), show that
most people are not opposed to trade per se but that they are concerned
about the conditions under which liberalization takes place. While simi-
larly detailed surveys are not (yet) available for other parts of the world, ex-
tensive analysis of poll questions on trade by Slaughter and Scheve ﬁnd
that U.S. voters are split right down the middle. They recognize the bene-
ﬁts of trade, in terms of lower costs and greater variety, but they are con-
cerned about the costs and they tend to weigh the costs more heavily than
the beneﬁts.
If the costs are addressed, however, (e.g., by providing training or other
adjustment assistance to those dislocated by trade), support for further lib-
eralization increases markedly. Respect for minimum labor standards is
also widely supported. In sum, most people are supportive of globaliza-
tion, as long as their other concerns are also addressed. Knowing more
about what those concerns are requires international economic institu-
tions to be more open and more willing to listen—and respond—to con-
stituencies beyond the business community and narrowly focused central
bankers, ﬁnance ministers, and trade negotiators.
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